THE COLORADO DOCTRINE OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND SOME UNSETTLED QUESTIONS by unknown
COLORADO DOCTRINE OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS. 71
THE COLORADO DOCTRINE OF RIPARIAN
RIGHTS, AND SOME UNSETTLED QUES-
TIONS.
We are developing in Colorado a system of riparian rights,
that negatives alike the principles that obtained both under the
common and the civil law; a system that is suigeneris, and strik-
ingly illustrative of the adaptive tendency of all law to meet
natural wants and accommodate itself to particular conditions.
The cardinal principles of the system are few and simple, but
the application of them to conflicting interests is sometimes
difficult. The attention that is now being paid to the reclama-
tion of arid lands by irrigation, the large amount of capital
that is being invested in irrigation enterprises, the growing
scarcity of water available for such purpose, and the consequent
necessity of husbanding and conserving it for beneficial uses,
makes the subject an important one. To the lawyer, it is largely
an unexplored field. The varied controversies that have already
arisen and some that are being foreshadowod have the charm
of novelty; and it is worthy of consideration by Colorado law-
yers whether a legislative code sufficiently minute and specific
to define with reasonable precision these rights and to afford a
practical working system for their enforcement is not fast
becoming an imperative need.
The Colorado doctrine of riparian rights may be summed up
in the statement that riparian proprietors, as such, have no
rights; that is to say, they have no usufruct of the waters flow-
ing in the natural streams, not enjoyed by others whose estates
are non-riparian. Two sections of the Constitution aptly and
tersely express the fundamental lines upon which our system
is founded. "The water of every natural stream, not hereto-
fore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is' hereby
declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedi-
cated to the use of the people of the State, subject to appropria-
tion as hereinafter provided." * * * "The right to divert
unappropriated waters of any natural stream for beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right as between those using the water for the same pur-
pose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not suffi-
cient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same,
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those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the pref-
erence over those claiming for other purposes, and those using
for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using
the same for manufacturing purposes."
These provisions deny the existence of riparian rights, ex-
cept as they rest upon appropriation. The State not only has
dominion, but asserts a sovereign ownership over the waters of
all natural streams, recognizing at the same time a right of
user by those who apply them to domestic, agricultural or man-
ufacturing uses, and without regard to the location of the lands
of the appropriator, whether along the stream or remote, there-
from. Indeed, no reason is seen why the waters of one water-
shed may not be diverted and appropriated for the benefit of
lands in another watershed, and such was the decision of the
Supreme Court of Colorado in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Com-
pany, 6 Colo. 433. Certain it is, that no limit can be placed,
except that established by nature, upon the quantity of water
that may be so diverted, provided it is in good faith, for actual
use, and no element of speculation is involved. A proprietor-
ship above or below on the stream, or along or remotely distant
from it, in theory gives no advantage. The test of right is
dependent on wholly different considerations.
This unlimited doctrine of appropriation has met the stric-
tures of an eminent writer on the subject, Professor Pomeroy,
who contends that it violates a primary and natural right,
which under all systems of jurisprudence has heretofore
received recognition. He asserts a right conferred by natural
law whereby those who own lands along a stream should be
allowed the use of water as an incident of title, and as a mat-
ter of inherent superior advantage over those whose lands do
not abut on the stream. The invasion of natural right, as it is
termed, involved in the Colorado system, will, he thinks, engen-
der countless strife and controversy in the future and render
our whole system a vicious one.
These fears are entirely groundless. The provisions of the
Constitution are an organic declaration of what was generally
considered to be the law from the earliest days of our territo-
rial existence. The titles of lands, riparian and non-riparian,
have been almost universally acquired having in view the
existence of such a system, ex necessitate rei, and hence it may
be said that any element of abstract justice is eliminated from
consideration. Nor can it be said that the practical workings
of the system show that it is unwise. Questions have arisen,
some are settled and some remain unsettled; but they have not
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originated out of the unlimited scope of the doctrine of appro-
priation, which is the basic principle of the system, and the
particular respect calling forth the criticism of Professor Pome-
roy. In truth, it is the only system that meets natural con-
ditions, one of which is that the lands on our mesas, more or less
remote from the water courses, are frequently the best adapted
to agriculture, by reason of the character of the soil, and the
availability of natural reservoir sites as strengthening adjuncts
of an irrigating system. If proof of this beyond our own
experience were needed, the fact that the entire arid region
included within the boundaries of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah,
Wyoming, Idaho, Dakota and Montana, is practically under the
same system, should demonstrate its utility, and its superior
adaptation to the wants of the people who are. settling up this
growing empire of the West.
It is erroneous, though, to suppose that the doctrine of
unlimited appropriation of water is a borrowed one, or that it
obtained under any previous system of jurisprudence of which
records are extant. It was evolved from the climatic and other
natural conditions that characterize the arid plateau of the
Rocky Mountain region. Its birth place was here, and it may
be said to be indigenous, as it were, to our sectional develop-
ment. Irrigation, as an art, antedates history. It was prac-
ticed by eastern nations from their infancy, and the prehistoric
remains of ancient systems attest the stupendous scale on
which it was done. Modern works sink into insignificance as
compared with the undertakings of the past, whereby water
was utilized to make the earth more bountiful. Archmologists
are nearly agreed that the cataracts of the Nile are the
remains of artificial construction. Nearly equidistant from
each other, they served as colossal dams, calculated by close
engineering science, partly for the purpose of enabling the
waters of the Nile to be diverted even to the confines of the
great desert. The records of ancient cities that flourished
centuries before Christ, where to-day are but shifting sands,
show the powerful agency of these immense public works in
creating a vigorous national life and civilization. The prehis-
toric monuments of the new world, as they are found to-day, in
Central America, Mexico and Arizona, exhibit the patient toil
and energy of the early races in planning and executing irri-
gation schemes upon a scale of magnificence which would
cause the modern capitalist to hesitate. In Arizona alone, more
than a thousand miles of ancient canals and laterals, built by
a forgotten people, in many places excavated through solid
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rock with the crude instruments of the stone age, made pos-
sible in a natural desert the means of subsistence for a large
population.
Records do not exist that enable us to determine in all cases
the system of legal rights by which the diversion and user of
water was controlled among these ancient peoples. Among
some of them, as in India and Egypt, undoubtedly the state
assumed the function of carrying forward these enterprises, and
the distribution of water was a matter of state administration,
under local rules and usages. Where the community system
prevailed, as in the pueblos of Mexico, the water of non-navi-
gable streams along which the pueblos were situate was trans-
ferred by the nation to the pueblo authorities, who were
entrusted with the division of it for the benefit of settlers. But
when we pass from the domain of mere custom to systematized
and established law, it is unquestionably true that the unqual-
ified doctrine of appropriation which we have made the key-
note of our system, and by which all the waters of a flowing
stream may be taken by one who is first in time in making use
of them, and without regard to the place of use, formed no part.
To a greater or less extent, some recognition was given to
riparian ownership, and some attempt made to reconcile the
larger use of water for irrigating purposes, especially by pro-
prietors whose estates were remote from the stream, with a
primary right existent in the riparian owner to a common
enjoyment in the flow of the stream.
Under the common law of England, of course, the doctrine
of prior appropriation had no place at all. The owner of land
along the stream had a right to the water in its accustomed
flow, which was wholly independent of user. It was an incident
of his ownership; he could at any time make use of it for all
reasonable purposes, in such a manner as not to interfere with
the public easement of navigation, returning it to the stream
without material change of quantity or quality, and no exclu-
sive appropriation by another could deprive him of this right.
It is true that dicta are to be found in some of the earlier Eng-
lish cases, notably Williams v. Morland, 2 Barn. and Cress. 913;
Liggins v. Inge, 7 Bing. 692; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 207, from
which it could be implied that an appropriation by one riparian
owner to beneficial use gave an exclusive right as against
others; that the water so withdrawn became private property,
and only what remained in tle stream continued publid juris,
but subject to successive appropriations in derogation of the
ommon right. This was the arid region doctrine, pure and
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simple, except that the exclusive enjoyment was confirmed to
those only whose lands abutted on the stream; and in the case
of Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 135 , these early dicta were relied on
by counsel as showing that the primitive common law rule was
in strict accord with the doctrine that property in the use of
water could be acquired by appropriation only. But it is suf-
ficient -to say that in the case of Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. and
Adol. i, Chief Justice Denman showed with great wealth of
learning that these early expressions of English judges did not
correctly state the law of England; and dating from that case,
all doubt on the subject was removed, so that the common law
as almost universally expounded at the present day negatives
the idea of appropriation conferring an exclusive right, except
where it rests upon a grant, or upon prescription presumptive
of a grant.
Equally, the Roman civil law recognized only a qualified
appropriation of water as property, and always "subject to a
common right by natural law, where it is capable of being fully
enjoyed without exclusive possession." (Bowyer Comm. MAd. Civil
Law, 64.) Although it is true that in those countries where irri-
gation received the encouragement of the state, the civil law
was accommodated in various ways to existing conditions of soil
and climate. In Mexico, for instance, while the common use of
waters of unnavigable streams was primarily for all who could
gain access to them, yet the government by special concessions
in most cases, and in other cases by usages and customs having
the force of law, permitted the diversion of the waters of such
streams and to that extent the deprivation of the common use,
but never in such a way as to despoil a lower estate, and no
individual or company not a riparian proprietor could acquire
the use of such water "without the previous corresponding per-
mission of the goverment." (Escriche title "Acegiuia.")
The history of California exhibits the development of a sys-
tem of water rights, under conditions somewhat similar to
those prevailing in Colorado, in which there is a curious blend-
ing of the doctrine of appropriation with substantially all the
common law incidents of riparian ownership. It is an interest-
ing history, because it illustrates how forcible were the physi-
cal conditions of the early settlers in establishing the right to
appropriate waters when the lands through which the streams
ran were public, and equally how tenacious in the judicial mind
was the idea of a common right of enjoyment by the owners
along the streams, when the title to suchlands became private.
When gold was discovered in California in 1848, and there fol-
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lowed the maddening rush of people from every clime and
quarter of the world to wrest a fickle fortune from the "fields,"
all the land belonged to the United States, except such private
claims as had.originated under Mexican sovereignty and were
protected by the treaty of acquisition. Necessity with these
pioneers was the mother of law-other law they had not. The
nationalities were as mixed as in any movement of people the
world had ever seen, but the Anglo-Saxon was supreme; and
with him came a spirit of fairness, a love of order, and a
demand for system that soon crystallized into a code of local
rules for the government of all. These rules recognized a pri-
ority of right in the first discoverer of a mining claim, and pre-
scribed the conditions under which that right might continue
or under which it "might be deemed abandoned. As a necessary
auxiliary to the exercise of such right, the streams were thrown
open and the waters conducted by artificial means to "claims "
remote from the banks, and there employed to wash out and
separate the virgin gold. Although at first confined in prac-
tice to mining purposes, the diversions extended to other util-
ities, to manufacturing, milling and irrigating. For eighteen
years and until the act of Congress of July 26, i866, these pos-
sessory rights received no formal sanction from the United
States government. So far as any control was vested in the
state, they were recognized by various enactments; but as
against the general government, or a patentee under the gov-
ernment, they were absolutely without force; so that a patent
to land issuing prior to the act of i866 was construed by the
courts of California and Nevada as vesting the grantee with all
the common law incidents of title appertaining to any natural
stream coursing through the land, unaffected by any prior
appropriation for any purpose. It was said that as long as the
lands and waters remained public, they were open to all, and
that abstract justice demanded that the first appropriator be
protected by according to him a superior right; but when pri-
vate ownership intervened, the water was held to be an element
inseparably connected by the laws of nature with the freehold
itself, as much so as the growing timber, and no adverse user,
short of a prescriptive right, could derogate from this natural
advantage of all whose lands were along the stream. (Van-
sickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249.)
The Statute of Congress passed July 26, x866, recognized and
confirmed all rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural,
manufacturing and other purposes, acquired by priority of
possession on the public lands, whenever such rights are
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acknowledged by local customs and laws, and by the subse-
quent act of July 9, I870, all patents are issued subject to such
vested rights.
The California system, therefore, assumed a dual character
in which the right of exclusive appropriation had a place, but
only in respect to lands which were part of the public domain;
and conversely, one who settled upon lands along a stream and
acquired the government's title before such priorities attached
had a status as at common law, which could not be affected by
any subsequent user on the part of others.
The situation was not a logical one. The stern necessities
that gave birth to the doctrine of appropriation were perma-
nent in character; they inhere in nature; they were the con-
ditions of the country and its people from which there could be
no escape. A custom had grown up wholly irreconcilable with
the accepted principles of the common law. It had the sanc-
tion of domestic law, and was encouraged by national legis-
lation. It was part of the history of the State, and so acquiesced
in. What good reason could there be for confining its scope to-
public lands, and implanting side by side with it the antagonis-
tic riparian doctrine for private lands ? It was an inconsistency
that could not withstand the test of experience, and which
sooner or later would become intolerable. History has since
demonstrated this.
Nevada was in line with California in adhering to the com-
mon law doctrine, until in 1889, in the case of Reno Smelting
Company and Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 21 Pac. 37, the
Supreme Court reversed its former rulings, and adopted the
principle of prior appropriation as the only one applicable to
the use of water in that State. In California, the courts felt
constrained to enlarge the reasonable uses which riparian
owners might make of the water, so as to authorize diversions
for purposes of irrigation, reference being had to the neces-
sities of all other owners along the stream; thus modifying the
common law rule, but falling far short of an unqualified accept-
ance of the principle of appropriation.
We think, then, it must be said that the Colorado system is
founded on a salutary principle, which if reasonably adminis-
tered and applied will produce better results in ultimate wealth
and population than any other that could be adopted. But
until a legislative code is enacted which will apply in some
detail the main underlying principle to the practical situations
that are being developed, a grave responsibility rests upon the
courts.
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It is a serious question how far the principle of prior appro-
priation can be carried into practical effect as among the indi-
vidual consumers of water under the same canal. There should
be, and ordiiiarily there is no difficulty in apportioning the
water of a natural stream among the canals taking water there-
from, in the order of their priority. These priorities have been
adjudicated, and the executive department of the State under-
takes to administer them. With watchful, competent and
honest superintendents of irrigation, there is no reason why
water can not be divided up in quantities and according to pri-
orities as the courts have established them. In times of short-
age, however, the acts of these admiiiistrative officials have
been oftentimes impeded by writs of injunction. A short lived
injunction sued out on behalf of one canal is potent sometimes
to disorganize the whole plan of distribution, and give it water
to which it is not entitled. A continuance of the injunction
for only twenty-four hours may be sufficient to work a grossly
inequitable result, and for this reason it behooves the courts to
be exceedingly chary in issuing writs which must have the
effect of arresting or interfering with the official distribution
of water. -
Simple as the scheme of distribution is in practice as among
canals having their headgates on the same stream, it would be
very complex if applied to consumers under the same canal;
and it remains an unsettled question whether the priority
arising from appropriation and guaranteed by the Constitution
extends to such individual consumers. Inasmuch as irrigation
is now undertaken by means principally of large canals, from
which rights are issued, represented by stock certificates, or
contracts, entitling the holder to a certain quantity of water, it
is of importance to know whether, if the supply be insufficient
for all, the courts will recognize a superior right among some
in the order in which they have appropriated their water to
individual needs. This question is becoming of greater
moment every year, but as yet it is not authoritatively settled.
In contemplation of such state of affairs, the Legislature of
1879 passed an act which provides in effect that the water car-
ried in a canal, if it be less than the full supply to which it is
entitled, shall be pro rated among the consumers thereunder, to
the end that all may suffer from the deficiency in proportion to
their several rights. In the case of The Farmers High Line
Canal and Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. iii, the
Supreme Court had occasion to consider this act, and the ques-
tion whether or to what extent it could stand with the constitu-
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tional guaranty of prior right. Each of the three judges filed
a separate opinion, and it cannot be said that as a court there
was any concurrence of views upon the proposition we have sug-
gested. It seemed to be considered by all that circumstances
might exist which would make it the duty of ditch companies to
limit the operation of this pro rating Statute by dividing con-
sumers into different classes, having unequal rights; as, for
instance, where a canal as originally projected and constructed
was afterwards enlarged, and an additional priority acquired
on account of the enlarged use. A convenient and perhaps
necessary dividing line is thus established, by which the orig-
inal consumers rank differently from those who should share
pro tanto only in the increased capacity. But in the absence of
a special feature of that character, does the constitutional man-
date require that the holders of water rights under the same
canal be accorded priorities among themselves in the order of
time in which they have severally begun farming operations?
We think it must be said, as was said by Justice Helm in the
Southworth case, that the Constitution does not contemplate
this. It is entirely impracticable. No such scheme for the dis-
tribution of water could be put in successful operation, and,
moreover, it would produce results as between consumers of
water under different canals which would necessarily defeat
the principle itself. If worked out logically, we could look for
the utmost confusion in the entire system of administration of
water rights. The difficulties are such that it is safe to say the
courts will never embark, except to a limited degree, in the
undertaking of recognizing individual priorities of consumers
under the same canal, or compel the managing officials of such
canals so to do in parceling out the water.
We have in Southern Colorado some large tracts of land, the
titles of which originated by private grant when this part of
the State was under the sovereignty of Mexico. These titles
are protected by the obligations of the treaty of Guadaloupe
Hidalgo, and in most cases the lands have been segregated
from the public domain and evidences of title passed from the
United States government to the grantees and their assigns.
They have within their boundaries natural streams, and the
contention is made that all the incidents of title under Mexican
law attach to these private grants, and that as one of such inci-
dents the owners have absolute control of such waters, irre-
spective of any user. In other words, that these waters are not
impressed with the public character ordained by the Constitu-
tion and so subject to appropriation by whomsoever will utilize
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them to beneficial ends; but that the rights thereto became
irrevocably fixed under an alien system of jurisprudence. The
question is very interesting, and in one aspect opens up histori-
cal inquiry as to the local customs prevailing in the Mexican
provinces prior to the cession as respects the diversion of
water from natural streams. In another aspect, it involves the
supremacy of a State, speaking either by its organic law or
through its Legislature, to define and regulate the rights of
riparian proprietors, irrespective of the source from which the
title of the land is derained. Does the treaty obligation protect
simply the title, and is it still within the jurisdiction of the suc-
ceeding sovereignty to provide the rules of law by which such
incidents of title as riparian rights shall be exercised? Judge
Riner, in the suits instituted by The United States Freehold
Land and Emigration Company, in the Circuit Court of the
United States, held to that view; but as the cases are now pend-
ing on appeal, it may still be considered an unsettled question.
The matter of the greatest practical importance to us in
Colorado must always relate to the statutory methods by which
the priorities of water'rights are adjudicated, and the machinery
by which the decrees are enforced. It is something to be
regretted that the legislation of x88x provided for a separate
proceeding in each water district, of which there are some sixty-
eight in the State. Many of these districts have their source of
supply from the same stream or its tributaries, and the conse-
quence has been that the users of water in each district have,
at considerable expense, proved their claims and obtained
awards of priority, which, while conclusive upon others in the
same district, have no strict legal force as against consumers in
other districts. It would have been infinitely better if each
adjudication had been coextensive with a certain drainage area,
as, for instance, the six divisions embracing the waters of the
Platte, Arkansas, Rio Grande, San Juan, Grand and Green
rivers. The priorities as then determined would be res adjudi-
cata as against all who take from the sdme natural stream or
any of its tributaries. No contention could then be made that
the court in one district was over prodigal in allowing claims
to the prejudice of appropriators in another district, and we
would have had much greater uniformity in the allotment of
water on a basis proportionate to actual needs.
These adjudications were made in many cases before the
growing scarcity of water became so keenly felt as at present,
and it must be admitted that some of our courts recognized very
extravagant claims, predicated not upon actual user, but on the
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carrying capacity of the ditches. The fault was largely in the
system, which, without scientific data as to the normal supply
of water in any given stream, and without a uniform standard
of measurement, imposed upon the district judges throughout
the State the duty of passing upon these claims. 'The conse-
quence has been quite anomalous, for it is well known that in
many cases the natural streams are not capable of carrying the
aggregate amounts of water that have been adjudged to claim-
ants, all of which, in theory at least, are, or should be, based
upon actual beneficial user.
A board of control organized as a branch of the executive
department, would have been much better competent to deal
with these questions of allotment; and with appropriate pro-
visions for an appeal to the courts in a controverted matter, we
would have had greater uniformity, a more conservative distri-
bution of water, and a degree of finality in the settlement of
claims which we do not have now. This in a general way is
the framework of the Wyoming system, which works well in
practice, and ought to serve as a model hereafter throughout
the arid region, where no system has yet been adopted.
In Colorado it is too late to change to the system of State
control. We traveled on a certain road, and cannot turn back.
Rights have become measurably fixed, and we must look to the
courts to finally correct many of the glaring extravagances
which have at times prevailed in the adjudication of water
rights. This can only be done by holding fast to the constitu-
tional idea that the right must be commensurate with the use,
and by refusing recognition to whatever has the slightest
appearance of speculation.
CHARLES E. GAST.
